This paper is concerned with the application of cognitive science to the problems of pedagogy. My discussion bears on teaching generally but I give some emphasis to the case of science education as illustrative. A voluminous literature professes to explain "How Cognitive Science Can Contribute to Education" (Bruer 1995). My concern is not to directly deny such claims or to impugn work that might W없rant them. However, I survey a sample of cognitive science writing that is demonstrably without any such value. Since the cases are chosen for their shortcomings, there is no suggestion that the work discussed is representative, but only widespread. The exercise is important because, if warranted, the critique reve떠s a malaise in the field where spurious cl떠ms for the educational value of cognitive science including neuroscience are so widespread.
as irrelevant to psychology and education. His reasons are revealing for their impenetrable obscurity:
An epistemological theory may be very relevant to psychology and education, not by virtue of being a psychological or educational theory, but by virtue of being a theory of knowledge. Clearly a psychologica 1 theory can be relevant to psych이logy and education for psychological rea'sons. Likewise, an epistemology can be relevant to psych이ogy and education for epistemological reasons. After all, if it is correct that science education is inescapably committed to epistemological assumptionssince it is fundamentally concerned with the growth of knowledge -then it is necess따y to have a theory of knowledge and not merely a theory of psychology ... Piaget ' s genetic epistemology can fulfil this epistemological role in an important and illuminating way. Hence, there are epistemological reasons for science educators to accept his theory. πris does not mean, however, that the theory is merely an abstract philosophical epistemological theory -this would belie the very nature of his genεtic epistemology ... it is an epistemology that is naturalistic and psychologistic, one containing an explicit psychological theory. For that reason it is p따ti cul따ly relevant as an epistemology for science educators. (1993, p. 145) Despite these final words of reassurance, some readers may remain unconvinced-or perhaps just uncomprehending.
Constructivism: Secular Reli밍on?
The theory of individual mental activity championed by Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995), seeing its origins in Kant, Berkeley and Piaget, has been characterized as the "fervor that is currently associated with constructivism " (Cobb 1994a, p 
. 4).2 Writing of this approach or doc며ne, Paul Ernest (1995)
2 For comprehensive critical analyses of the issues and varieties of constructivism in relation to education, see M.R. Matthews ed. 1998. has written of constructivism as "the most important theoretical perspective to emerge in mathematics education" in the past decade or two. He adds that the attacks on constructivism "served as a platform from which it was launched to widespread international acceptance and approbation" (Ernest 1995) . D.C. P피피ps (1997, p. 152) has noted that "Arguably it is the dominant theoretical posi다on in science and mathematics education " and remarks:
Across the broad fields of educational theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion. (Phillips 1995 p. 5)
However, I suggest that, despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, the 'radical constructivism' of von Glasersfeld has no pedagogical consequences at 떠l. Acknowledging its controversial status, von Glasersfeld has remarked "To introduce epistemological considerations into a discussion of education has always been dynamite" (quoted in Ernest 1995, p. xi). An indication of the explosive mixture may be seen in the remarkable range of philosophical issues raised in the educational literature. These include extremely abstruse questions whose relevance to practical or theoretical problem in education is surely doubtful. πms, among the topics discussed are Berkeleyan idealism, Cartesian dualism, Kantian constructivism, Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian incommensurability, Quinean underdetermination, truth, relativism, instrumentalism, rationalism and empiricism, inter alia. Thus, Gergen (cited in Steffe & Gale eds, 1995, p. xii) sees certain lapses in "Cartesian epistemology and the "mind-body split끼 though the conceivable bearing of this on educational matters remains obscure. Likewise Steffe ( 1995, p. 성ii) contrasts various consσuctivist approaches with "the C따tesian model " , suggesting that they "differed from the Cartesian model in viewing knowledge in a nondualistic manner so as to avoid to mind-body split of endogenic (mind centred) and exogenic (reality-centred) knowledge" (1995, p. xiii). Unfortunately, Steffe also neglects to explain how Cartesian dualism might have the slightest bearing on science teaching, or anyt비ng else for that matter.3 3 In passing, we might note that the mind-body split is a different issue from that of the objective reality of a mind-independent world, though Steffe seems to conflate these.
Moreover, we might be suspicious of claims that we have been seriously misguided in our conceptions of knowledge since the origins of science in Ancient Greece (von Glasersfeld in Steffe & Gale eds, p. 6). Nevertheless, von Glasersfeld suggests that his conception of constructivism arose "out of a profound dissatisfaction with the theories of knowledge in the tradition of Western philosophy" and recommends that adopting his constructivism "could bring about some rathεr profound changes in the gε: neral practice of education " (1989, p. 135). His ra버cal recommendation is: "Give up the requirement that knowledge represents an independent world" (in Steffe & Gale eds., p. 6-7). 까1is is undeniably a revolutionary suggestion for any teacher of science or history since it suggests that. their discipline has no subject matter in the external world. von Glasersfeld has explicitly drawn his constructivist stance from what he takes to be the insights of Berkeley ' s idealism. He says Berkeley ' s insight "wipes out the major rational grounds for the belief that human knowledge could represent a reality that is independent of human experience " (von Glasersfeld, 1995, p. 34). However, despite these extravagant claims regarding "the 깐rinking organism ' s cognitive isolation from 'reality "' (von Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 121), we will see that the educational recommendations actu따ly offered are rather modest.
Epistemology or pedagogy?
Regarding the "orgar피sm ' s isolation from re와ity " and its implications for teaching, von Glasersfeld was explicitly asked whether constructivism is to be understood as an epistεmology or 야dagogy. In brief, good teachers make sure students pay attention and understand the lesson! Inevitably one wonder정 how differently a teacher might do things if not O야rating "from a constructivist perspec디ve.
"
5. From the metaphysical to the mundane von Glasersfeld has suggested that "taken seriously" radical constructivism "is a profoundly shocking view" which requires that "some of the key concepts underlying educational practice have to be refashioned " . Among these "profoundly shoe퍼ng " recommendations he suggests the following:
... students w피 be more motivated to le따n something, if they can see why it would be useful to know it.
Teac비ngand n없ning 따e two practices that differ in their methods and, as a consequence, have very different results .. .. rote learning does not lead to 'c띠i양1tenment ' .
... in order to m여ify students' thinking, the teacher needs a model of how the student thinks. ... learning science involves being initiated into scientific ways of knowing. Scientific entities and ideas, which are constructed, validated, and communicated through the cultural institutions of science, are unlikely to be discovered by individuals through their own empirical inquiry; learning science thus involves being initiated into the ideas and practices of the scientific community and making these ideas and practices meaningful at an individual level. The role of the science educator is to mediate scientific know ledge for learners, to help them make personal sense of the ways in which knowledge claims are generated and validated, rather than to organize individual sense-making about the natural world. (Driver et al. 1995, p. 6) I suggest that foregoing passage may be translated without remainder to the following:
Learning science involves learning science. Individuals cannot rediscover science by themselves. So, the role of teachers is to teach.
A diction따y is helpful for translating between consσuctivese and English: cultural apprenticeship = learning neutr와izing a perturbation = le따ning something new personal consσuction and meaning making = understanding mediation process involving intervention and negotiation with an authority = teaching community of discourse = group dialogic process = talking discourse practices = talking contingent flow of communicative interaction between human beings = talkin g engagement = paying attention off task behaviour = not paying attention experiential constraints of the ever-present socio-physical context = the real world πms, it is much more impressive to say "The discursive practices in science classrooms differ substantially from the prac디ces of scientific 따gument and enquiry that take place within various communities of professional scientists" than the equivalent "kids in school don ' t do the same thing as scientists " .
Instead of merely saying "talking among teachers and students " we can say "the discursive practices that support the coconstruction of scientific knowledge by teachers and students" (Driver et al. 1994 Where someone might wish to say only that "students figure things out for themselves in class with others끼 a more impressive rendering would be "I ear따1g is characterized by the subjective reconstruction of societal means and models through negotiation of meaning in social interaction" and "students ' interactive constitution of the class-room microculture " (Cobb 1994b, p. 15).
Cognitive Science
In a recent article P.S .C. Matthews ( 1997) suggests that "the basic consσuctivist view that all knowledge is constructed by the knower through the action of a gener떠ised cognitive capacity must be discarded " (1997, p. 113).
πris judgement is based on considerations from recent C땅때ve science and especially the study of language acquisition which suggest "A Nativist thesis about whether conceptual change in children might, in fact, involve the same kinds of extreme epistemic shifts as in scientific revolutions, and he recommends pursuing research into this question. In P따ticular, Thagard offers highly qualified pedagogical optin피sm:
Answers to questions such as these will not only increase our understanding of how children ' s knowledge develops; they may also improve our success in educating children and older students to a more advanced understanding of science (1992, p. 261).
Such cautious anticipation of the potential relevance to education is to be contrasted with the extravagant, though empty, claims widely made.
Nersessian (1989), too, writes on 'Conceptual Change in Science and in Science Education' and, like 'Thagard, where she addresses 깐1e "instructional implications " of these claims her tone is highly qualified and tentative:
As stated at the outset this paper is exploratory in nature. Not enough is known about either conceptual change in science or the relationship between the discovery process and the learning process to come to 때y definite conclusion about how to generate effective instructional strategies. (1989, p. 176) πris is a candid, if optimistic, assessment of the pedagogical value of the work on conceptual mapping and change she cites. In fact, the recommendations derived from this research amount to educational commonplaces, which is not to say that they are unimportant or without value:
... students' preconceptions are highly resistant to instruction. … π1e instructional import of this is that in teaching a scientific conceptual structure, a number of concepts need to be targeted for revision at the same time and new concepts introduced in a coordinated fashion. Unlike the scientists who rrst constructed the conceptual framework, we can take advantage of hindsight and emphasize the relevant conceptual interconnections in instruction .
... Calling attention to differences between student and scientific meanings of a word may be quite useful in the instructional process. (1989, p. 176,7) ... the student must learn to think at a level of abstraction not customarily required for reasoning about commonsense objects. πms, instruction in abstraction techniques might aid students in building the requisite scientific ontologies. (1989, p. 178) 8. 'From Conceptual Development to Science Education' Vosniadou 뻐d loannides (1998) plausibly suggest that it is only on the basis of research into the development of children ' s knowledge of the physical world "that we can make sound decisions about the design of science curricula as well as about instructional methods and strategies " (1998, p. 1214). The authors detail their insights into children ' s conceptual progress in learning about the physical world and they note that "Developmental research has produced certain important findings about the nature and process of conceptual change " (1998, p. 1222) . These include the finding that by the time c피ldren enter elementary school, they "have already constructed initial conceptual structures about the physical world which are very different from the scien뼈c concepts to which they will be exposed through instruction " (1998, p. 1222).
、'o sniadou 때d Ioannides argue that the process of conceptual change revising and abando피ng these initial conceptions "appears to be a gradual and complex aff없r " and,fur깐1ermore, this gradualist view is different from the view of other researchers (e.g. Posner et al., 1982) who focus on the incompa다bility between two 따S따1ct and equally well organized explanatory systems which compete with one another. Vosniadou 때d Ioannides suggest that these alternative views of conceptual change -gradualist revision and holistic competition -have implications for science instruction and the design of curricula.
In considering these, it must first be noted that, on their own account, cognitive psychology does not deliver any unambiguous, unequivocal theoretical foundation for extracting educational implications. Nevertheless, from their preferred view, it follows that "h may be more profitable to design curricula that focus on the deep exploration 때d understanding of a few, key concepts in one subject-ma뾰r area rather than curricula 암iat cover a great deal of material in a superficial way " (1998, p. 1223). As usual, this is undoubtedly sound advice, thou맹 it is not derivable only from modem cogr피tive science research. Identical recommendations were made by Ernst Mach a century earlier:
I believe the amount of matter necessary for a useful education, ... is veη sm머1. ... I know nothing more terrible than the poor creatures who have learned too much ... What they have acquired is a spider ' s web of thoughts too weak to furnish sure supports, but complicated enough to produce confusion. (quoted in MR. Matthews, 1992, p. 14).
Ad〔lition따 recommendations about the need to provide subject matter in 때 appropriate sequence corresponding to the r여uirements of conceptual ordering and intelligibility are also impeccable, but familiar educational advice now endorsed by cognitive science research.
Similarly sound advice reiterates the familiar "realization " that "students do not come to school as empty vessels but have representations, beliefs and presuppositions about the way the physical world operates that are 바ffi.c띠t to ch없1ge " (1998, p. 1223). Further, we le따n that "'I농achers need to be informed about how students see the physical world and to le없n to take their points of view into consideration when they design instruction " (1998, p. 1223). And so, It is important to reiterate and emphasize that to remark upon the platitudinous nature of such observations is not to criticize the cognitive science resεarch in question because psychology is really difficult and we are lucky if we can understand anything at all about the most complex phenomena of intelligence and thought. In the same way, noting that we can visually recognize physical objects is not a novelty as such, though we have no adequate understanding of the perceptual, cognitive mechanisms responsible for this everyday expertise of the "visual v따uoso " (Hoffman 1998 However, Jung clearly does not think that such truism is generally characteristic of the contribution of cognitive science to education. Accordingly, he surveys a number of key concepts from cognitive science to show by contrast how they may offer something of value to the educator.
The concept of a schema
After noting that the 'schema ' idea is not new, he acknowledges that cognitive science has made some innovations in giving schemas a "procedural 
42). π피s means only that physics does n아 consist just of empty formulae -an
insight which science educators can hardly credit to cognitive science. Jung also expl없ns that the formulae of advanced physics rest on more 밟mentary qu때tative understandings but cognitive science research can not claim credit for bestowing this deep insight on teachers either.
Model Based Reasoning
Nersessian (1995) considers "model-based reasoning" that is concerned with domain-independent processes rather than those which are domain specific. In particular, she explains that constructive modeling "is a dynamic reasoning process involving analogical and visual modeling and mental simulation to create models of the target problem where no diI℃ct analogy exists" (1995, p. 207). π10ugh undeniably of great intrinsic interest, the details of these matters may be ignored here since my point is only to consider the educational conclusions drawn from them. These amount to the recommendation that students be taught to think in the way that scientists do. This is undoubtedly impeccable advice, but it will hardly be new for science teachers. Thus, constructive mode파1g, (e.g. thinking about physics problems) should be taught "in the context of solving real domain problems" (1995, p. 223). Critical aspects of teaching such scientific reasoning include the question: "What is the knowledge students have when they arrive in the classroom?
" and "Hands-on laboratory experiences could be supplemented by computer laboratories simulating the same phenomena " (1995, p. 223). Again, the undoubted benefits of these recommendations can hardly be attributed to the insights of modem cognitive science which is less secure and less reliable than traditional, intuitive teac비ng methods-a theme to which I will return. Central to the theory of cognitive load are the limitations on working memory whose processing capacity determines how much information may be effectively presented. "π1e ease with which information may be processed in working memory is a prime concern of cognitive load theory" (1998, p. 259).
Cognitive Load
Working memory simply is incapable of highly complex interactions using novel (i.e., not previously stored in long-term memory) elements. It follows, that instructional designs and instructional recommendations that require learners to engage in complex reasoning processes involving combinations of unfamiliar elements are likely to be deficient. (1998, p. 254).
This amounts to the recommendation: Don
' t present students with too much complex information at once. πris is undoubtedly sound advice but it seems likely that in many cases, the difficulty w피 not be due to the demands made on memory during presentation, but rather by the subsequent difficulty of the conceptualization, repriεsentational efficiency, reasoning and problem-s이ving. That is, obstacles to learning are likely to be a function of the difficulty of understanding through the kind of conceptual restructuring discussed by However, this account of understanding appears to leave out something essential. Even if it is correct as far as it goes in identifying a source of difficulty in understanding, it could not be the whole story. It implies that the main, or only' reason someone can ' t understand a proposition of quantum theory is that it overloads working memory. However, it is likely that being easily h리d in working memory does not su퍼ce to make something easy to understand. π1e quantitative issue of storage capacity is undoubtedly a factor in ease of comprehension, but since it will affect all forms of knowledge equally, it is unlikely to be the most salient factor in variations of difficulty. π1e demands made on working memory cannot explain why two items of similar cognitive load might differ in their comprehensibility, unless the two are identified by definitional fiat. Though a full account is beyond the scope of current 깐1eoretical or empirical research, it seems clear from the studies already cited (Thagard 1992, C피 1981) that conceptual 이fficulty will not be a simply quantifiable property and will generally be due to other factors such as representational format and efficiency quite different from mere demand on storage load. As Sweller acknowledges,6 an example of a learning task that is low in element interactivity and also difficult to understand would falsify a strong version of the cognitive load claim. Thus, Heisenberg ' s equation Ax.
Lip 츠 h/2 would appear to make similar demands on working memory as the gas law PV = nRT, but it would seem that the 이fflculty of learning the former depends on the greater background theoretical knowledge required. Nevertheless, Sweller et al. appear to reduce difficulty of learning to 6 Personal communication.
quan디ta디ve measures of " elem하1t interactψity " and the demands on memory:
Although there are many factors that a designer may consider, the major thesis of this paper is that the cognitive load imposed by instructional designs should be the pre-eminent consideration when determining design sπuctures. Limited working memory is one of the defining aspects of human cognitive architecture and, accordingly, all insπuctional designs should be analyzed from a co맹itive load perspective. (1998, p. 262) πris w파 not be sound advice to the extent that learning difficulties derive from the other conceptual, intellectual factors which are presently poorly understood, though plausibly different from the effects of cognitive load. Thus, the obstacle to le따ning novel theories and concepts in science or mathematics are likely to arise from the difficulties of making the kinds of conceptual re org때ization analogous to 'Gestalt shifts ' which have been the subject of an extensive literature (Carey 1985, πiagard 1992). Such conceptual change and its associated difficulties have more to do with inter-relations 없nong concepts than limitations on working memory. Accordingly, it might be reasonable to suggest that "따l instructional designs should be analyzed from a cognitive load perspective " , but this will be, at best, necess따y though not sufficient for optimal design. Accordingly, it is questionable whether considerations of cogr피tive load should be "pre-eminent 
The Educational Relevance of Cogi피tive Neuroscience
Finally we may examine an article that has generated extensive discussion concerning its claims for the relevance of cognitive neuroscience to education. The lengthy survey article by J.P. Byrnes and N. A. Fox (1998) has been followed by sever떠 responses in a symposium issue of the journal Educational Psychology Review. Despite the evident seriousness with which the article has been received, it is perhaps among the most egregious examples of the tendency to make extravagant, though entirely empty claims. πiat is, amid the pages of scientific erudition 뻐d esoteric neuropsych이logical exposition, there is barely more than a sentence or two in the entire article that even addresses questions of educational relevance. In principle, therefore, the matter may be disposed of briefly since there is nothing of pedagogical interest deserving commεnt. Nevertheless, an examination of the discussion is revealing.
In the usual rhetorical fashion, the authors endorse the recommendations of other researchers who "contend that the time has come to use the findings of Student motivation, at least, is surely well known to be improved by a wide range of methods -all without the benefit of any "precise model" from theoretical psychology or neuro science. Under the heading of 'Educationally Relevant Research in Cognitive Neuropsych이logy', wemi양1t expect the fulfillment of their promise to give the directly relevant neuroscience findings that will transform the field of educational psychology. However, instead, Byrnes and Fox begin by conceding reasonably enough that "Not all of the research in cognitive neuropsychology has 버rect implications for education" such as the neural basis of face recognition (1998, p. 317) . Presumably the neural basis of face recognition is intended to contrast with the many other issues they have discussed which are supposed to be directly relevant, though they are no more so. Be that as it may, their remark must be taken to mean that at least some cognitive neuropsychology does have direct relevance, and in this section they promise to discuss those "that have obvious connections to educational theory and practice " (1998, p. 318) . Amid the welter of technical details concerning the reticular activating system and other such matters they say "In general, what students le따n from 때 experience is very much a function of what they attend to " (1998, p. 318) . π피s profundity appears to be the only educationally relevant remark in the entπe section. Indeed, this remark is practically the only sentence in the entire article even remαely relevant to teaching. The only other direct statement concerning educational practices actually disavows what the reader had been led to assume from the outset and further retracts the qualified assertions of relevance we have just noted: "---we are not saying that there are direct links between basic brain research and educational . πris is a reassuring, but meaningless, remark which might be interpreted charitably as saying only that knowledge of some neuropsychology connected with school learning might help teaching practices, provided it is accurate. π1e assertion is plai띠y false because, even if we could have accuratε knowledge of the neuropsychology of some school-related brain function such as reading, for example, it need not provide any prac디cal implications for teaching methods. How could localization of mathematical reasoning by fMRI or PET scans help the teacher or curriculum planner?
Byrnes and Fox add "A theory cannot be said to be entirely accurate if it is inconsistent with neuroscientific 피1dings " (1998, p. 331). π꾀s remark seεms intended to emphasize the indispensability of neuroscience as guarantor for theories in psych이logy and, thereby, its indispensability for the educator. On one construal, the observation is correct but pointless here. If intended to mea I l only that psych이logy is supervenient ur"n neuroscience this is innocuous but irrelevant to 뻐y conceivable educational policies, since psychology is also supervenient upon quantum physics which is eq뻐ly irrelevant to pedagogic떠 practice. Any stronger construal of the remark is indefensible. Thus, if the claim is that a psychological theory cannot be correct unless it is known to be consistent with neuroscientific findings, this would contradict the autonomy of special sciences such as psychology which is just the possibility of formulating generalizations in a propriet따y vocabulary as in chemistry or biology (see Pylyshyn 1984 ). Psychology does not depend for its truth upon the facts of neuroscience any more than theories of biology depend on physics. Aristotle had genuine psychological and pedagogical insights despite believing that the mind was located in the heart, not the brain. But of course, these issues of SU야rvenience and inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of science (Fodor 1981) have no bearing on the supposed educational value of neuroscience. More generally, if the foregoing critique is a fair representation of content of the article by Byrnes and Fox, it is remarkable that it can be taken seriously at all in an educational context.
The Paradox of Pedagogy
The cognitive science research we have surveyed is unquestionably important as cognitive science, but of limited, or, in some cases, negligible, value to the educator. Clearly, teaching has succeeded admirably for centuries without benefit of the latest theories of cognitive science. πris is perhaps the strongest argument for the irrelevance of psychology to pedagogy. It should be obvious that both teac비ng and le따ning are among the natural, intuitive mental skills that humans engage in without the need for explicit theory. In many cases, teachers will continue effectively without knowing or caring about cognitive science.
Ironically, it is cognitive science itself that provides some theoretical support for this claim. Leaming lies somewhere on the spectrum between rote, repetitive memorization or data-driven inductive inference on the one hand, and automatic, bi이ogically 따iven innatεly specified acquisition on the other. As already mentioned, nativist views emerging from contemporary 파1guistics and cognitive science are undoubtedly an over-reaction to empiricist conceptions of learning. But even if teachers and textbooks do not provide merely the kind of triggering experience which leads to language acquisition, it remains that instruction is better understood as having a facilitating role rather than a classical or operant conditioning one. Teacher and learner are perhaps better conceived on the analogy of speaker and hearer in conversation than owner and pet in obedience training. Explanations in a teaching context share many features of ordinary linguistic communication and, indeed, teaching is, after 떠1, liter떠ly a form of 파1guistic communication, inter alia. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the communicative competence required will be largely the kind of automa디c, instinctive skill familiar from other cognitive domains of "expertise " . To the extent that this is so, neither the teacher or learner will benefit from explicit theoretical understanding of what they do, just as the bicycle trainee is unlikely to benefit from the differential equations which describe the mental representations involved in mastering the skill. Thus, there is, after 따1, an insight from cogr띠ve science and the expert/novice literature that is relevant to education: The characteristic feature of expertise is its unconscious, intuitive nature. Moreover, the novice acquires this largely 안rrough automatic mechanisms -the 'osmosis ' of apprenticeship and practice rather than explicit instruction. Teaching may be more like instruction for bicycle riding than we had thought: All you can do is say "Hold tight and pedal fast " ; the rest is up to the learner.
